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LOCATION PRIVACY UNDER DIRE THREAT AS UBERVEILLANCE STALKS 
THE STREETS 
By Katina Michael and Roger Clarke 
 
Abstract 
Location tracking and monitoring applications have proliferated with the arrival of smart 
phones that are equipped with onboard global positioning system (GPS) chipsets. It is 
now possible to locate a smart phone user down to 10 metres of accuracy on average. 
Innovators have been quick to capitalise on this emerging market by introducing novel 
pedestrian tracking technologies which can denote the geographic path of a mobile user. 
At the same time there is contention by law enforcement personnel over the need for a 
warrant process to track an individual in a public space. This paper considers the future of 
location based people tracking in Australia and emphasises the importance of citizen 
consent. 
 
COVERT PEOPLE TRACKING AND MONITORING 
Knowing where someone has been,1 what they are doing right now, and being able to 
predict where they might go next using historical or near real-time data is incredibly 
powerful.2 Humans do not move around in a random manner.3 The implementation of 
such tracking and monitoring location services are very important in the emergency 
sector but we are now witnessing the seemingly “legal” deployment of new applications 
that allow for real-time people tracking in closed campus-based zones like shopping 
malls, airports and transport hubs, as well as neighbouring locations. This kind of covert 
tracking can only be described as a type of secret surveillance. Not only is it secret but it 
is also atypical and indiscriminate. Secret surveillance differs from covert surveillance 
because the subject never finds out that they have been watched. In covert surveillance, 
the subject does not know they are being watched at the time the surveillance is occurring 
but will likely find out after-the-fact.  
 
When one visits a shopping mall they find themselves surrounded by CCTV cameras. 
From the parking lot to the shopping mall walkways, and from the cafeterias to the stores 
they visit, customers are always under surveillance. At least notices like “you are now 
being watched” or “smile you are being recorded” let consumers explicitly know that 
they are under observation. But the tracking of a mobile phone throughout a complex has 
a look-and-feel to it that essentially goes above and beyond CCTV- it is an all-
encompassing, all-pervading view of the citizen. It is in other words an “uber” view, 
providing a set of uber analytics to shopping complex owners and their constituents. 
Despite uberveillance4 having become synonymous with planetary scale systems in a 
global theatre, uberveillance can be equally detrimental within a limited geographic 
space.5 Uberveillance has to do with the ability to obtain identification, near real-time 
location tracking and condition monitoring of the subject. It answers the fundamental 
who, where and when questions in an attempt to derive why, what and how. It is more 
than traditional forms of visual surveillance like CCTV and the linking together of 
personal information with consumer credit transaction data- it is the sum total of various 
types of surveillance.6 
 
Obscure Commercial Location-Based Services 
In almost every case citizens are oblivious to the fact that the temporary mobile 
subscriber identity is being transmitted from their mobile phone, allowing for 
multilateration of their exact location in the shopping mall.7 The other issue is that they 
have not formally consented to providing such mobile phone data to a third party, in this 
case a location service provider (LSP) whom they have never had contact with, and 
whom it is very likely their mobile telephone operator has never had contact with. Private 
organisations developing these mobile tracking solutions, state that they are not gaining 
access to any personal information such as a name, mobile telephone number or contents 
of a short message service (SMS). They stress they are simply using “complex 
algorithms” to denote the geographic position of a mobile, using strategically located 
“proprietary equipment” in a campus setting.8  
 
Up until now, citizens have been subjected to “legitimate” surveillance of various degrees 
and orders of granularity by the government in the name of national security. We are now 
conceivably opening the floodgates for anyone who has the relevant technology to join 
the ranks. The Australian Parliament has unquestioningly granted powers to national 
security agencies to use location technology to track citizens under the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003 and to 
intercept telecommunications. Similarly, parliamentarians have failed the public by 
permitting a warrant to be signed by the Attorney General to temporarily allow special 
investigative powers to track a suspect or their vehicle for a period of time.9 But are these 
already-gross breaches of the principle of a free society to be extended to the 
authorisation of a private organisation to track mobiles of ordinary citizens because it 
may lead to better services planning or more efficient advertising and marketing?10 
 
INVADING THE LOCATION PRIVACY OF A CONSUMER 
Whether or not providers of new services are breaching the applicable statutory Privacy 
Principles, they are invading the locational privacy of each user. One interpretation of 
location privacy is that it “is the ability of an individual to move in public space with the 
expectation that under normal circumstances their location will not be systematically and 
secretly recorded for later use”.11 A more concise definition of location privacy is the 
interest an individual has in controlling information about their location. Tracking 
privacy follows as the interest an individual has in controlling information about their 
sequence of locations. Contrary to the assertions of consumer-marketing corporations, 
privacy expectations always have existed in public spaces, and continue to exist.12  
 
Users demand that services such as a personal location chronicle system, people follower 
or footpath route tracker system that systematically collects personal location information 
from a personal device they are carrying, can only be provided on the basis of consent, 
that is to say voluntary opt-in.13 This data is highly sensitive because it can be used to 
conduct behavioural profiling of individuals (even if they remain “nameless”) in 
particular social settings. They may even provide any organisation that gains access to the 
data the capacity to make judgements on individuals based on their choices of which 
stores they walk into and which they do not. For example, if a subscriber visits a 
particular religious bookstore within a shopping mall on a weekly basis, the assumption 
can be made that they are in some way affiliated to that religion.14  
 
While corporations and law enforcement agencies assert that individuals cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a public space, tracking the movements of a person 
as they go about their business is in fact a breach of a fundamental expectation to be let 
alone. In policing for example, in most democratic countries, it is against the law to 
covertly track an individual or their vehicle without prior approval of a warrant. Tracking 
by any means has always required legal authority, although this principle has been 
compromised in many countries since 2001. Warrantless tracking15 using a mobile phone 
(or any other electronic instrument such as a GPS strapped to a vehicle), generally results 
in evidence obtained without the proper authority and is inadmissible in a court of law. 
Some law enforcement agencies have argued for the abolition of the warrant process 
because the red tape often means that valuable information is lost and the suspect cannot 
be prosecuted for a crime they have likely committed.16 These issues are not new but far 
from eliminating a warrant process the appropriate response it to invest the energy in 
streamlining this process.17 
 
The Potential for Warrantless Tracking 
Warrantless tracking is largely against the law even when undertaken by law enforcement 
personnel in Australia. How then can it be in any way acceptable for a form of 
warrantless tracking to be undertaken by or on behalf of corporations or mainstream 
government agencies, of shoppers in a mall, or travellers in an airport, or commuters in a 
transport hub? Why should an LSP have the right to do what a law enforcement agency 
cannot normally do? It is very disturbing that this kind of invasion of locational privacy 
involves no incentive, no value proposition for the individual whose mobile is being 
tracked, and of course and more importantly it is being done without their knowledge.18 
Companies specialising in these kinds of location intelligence applications are interested 
in how they might help shopping mall owners better value their floorspace in terms of 
rental revenues, and to identify points of on-foot traffic congestion to on-sell physical 
advertising and marketing floorspace.19 In short, they are making a profit from devices 
possessed by the average citizen who has visited a shopping mall for the purchase of 
goods and services. In reality, an entity is covertly collecting data from the citizen that 
could be used in various ways to exploit the person in financial or other ways. Even if 
privacy were not a human right, this would demand statutory intervention on the public 
policy grounds of commercial unfairness. 
 
Organisations specialising in these solutions may state in their disclaimer that they are 
not collecting, or are not disclosing personally identifiable information, and that they only 
ever provide aggregated data at varying zone levels to the shopping mall owners. There is 
no explicit definition of what constitutes a zone however, only that aggregated data at the 
smallest zone level that is at the highest geographic resolution, is more expensive to 
purchase. The information that can be captured among other details includes: 
- dwell times in front of shop windows 
- repeat visits by shoppers in varying frequency durations 
- typical route/ circuit paths taken by shoppers as they go from shop to shop during 
a given shopping experience.20  
More disturbing still is that some companies claim that their proprietary technology can 
acquire data that can derive the nationality of the cell phone owner.21 This is despite the 
fact that this kind of action flies in the face of telephonic interception laws, and that 
mobile phones and SIM cards are transferable items.  
 
In addition to the “transparency” that this process inflicts on the shopper is the disturbing 
potential to collect data about the interactions of a given shopper(s) at a given mall, and 
then to also follow them to a neighbouring area such as a nearby town centre.22 This 
would mean that individuals were being tracked, potentially directly to their place of 
residence or place of employment, depending on the distance range of the network 
equipment element used to track the location of a shopper. Even if only aggregated data 
is sold to businesses, the individual records still reside on the LSP’s database server, 
possibly even outside the local jurisdiction. There is also the potential of overlaying this 
data with other personal information, including visual surveillance footage and customer 
transaction histories.23 The notion of dataveillance here is especially important “…the 
systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions 
or communications of one or more persons.”24 This is where traditional visual 
surveillance intersects with data surveillance giving breath to what is now being dubbed 
“smart” surveillance.25 
 
WHAT REGULATORY PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS? 
What are the rights of the consumer in a situation like this? And do users have control 
over their personal locational information? Clearly they do not. One need only ponder 
what rights employees might have if such a system was ever to be instituted in an 
organisational or employment setting, and what types of workplace surveillance laws 
might protect the employee from constant monitoring. This applies to commuters at an 
airport. In short, there has been no established social contract entered into between the 
parties, rendering the subscriber powerless. It is a blanket coverage application that 
monitors people on a large campus.  
 
Some of the LSPs offering such services have not even stated clearly who has access to 
the data, where it is transferred for processing, and the length of time it will be retained.26 
The claim of 1-2 metre locational accuracy, which has yet to be supported by 
experimental test cases is also contestable, which raises questions about the reliability of 
inferences that the LSP or the shop-owner draw. If the data is the subject of a warrant or 
subpoena, the data’s inaccuracy could result in false accusations and even a miscarriage 
of justice, with the “wrong” person finding themselves in the “right place” at the “right 
time”. 
 
Privacy laws are being continually eroded by exceptions built into subsequent legislation 
and by technological capabilities that were not contemplated when the laws were passed.  
Location privacy has yet to be specifically addressed in any Australian privacy legislation. 
The state of Victoria has responded generally to locational privacy, among other forms of 
privacy, by introducing a Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities that 
came into force on 1 January 2007.27 The Telecommunications (Interception) 
Amendment Act 2006 and the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, however, do cover 
inappropriate interception and access, use, communication and publication of location 
information that is obtained from mobile device traffic.28 On the other hand, when 
Google Inc. intercepted wi-fi signals and recorded the data they contained, the Privacy 
Commissioner absolved the company,29 and the Australian Federal Police refused to 
prosecute despite a clear (although possibly “inadvertent”) breach of the criminal law.30 
 
Industry Guidelines 
In 2010, the Australian Mobile Telecommunications Association (AMTA) released new 
industry guidelines to help promote the privacy of people using location-based services 
(LBS) on mobile devices. AMTA specifically called on location service providers to act 
in a manner befitting existing legislation in Australia. AMTA provided the following 
guidelines: 
1. every LBS must be provided on an opt-in basis with a specific request from a user 
for the service; 
2. every LBS must comply with all relevant privacy legislation;  
3. every LBS must be designed to guard against consumers being located without 
their knowledge; 
4. every LBS must allow consumers to maintain full control; and 
5. every LBS must enable customers to control who uses their location information 
and when that is appropriate, and be able to stop or suspend a service easily 
should they wish.31 
Point 2 is a matter for Parliaments, privacy oversight agencies and law enforcement 
agencies, not industry, and is not a matter for industry guidelines.  
 
The real problem however is that industry guidelines are just not effective. Generally, if a 
code does contain provisions of value, then it is likely to be ignored by industry members. 
This has been the case with the Biometrics Code. In December 2010, the Biometrics 
Institute reported that it was “still struggling to get members to sign onto its voluntary 
biometric privacy code… Moeller said this is because businesses are reluctant to impose 
guidelines that may restrict their competitiveness against non-compliant rivals. It would 
also make it tougher to implement biometrics solutions.” Ironically, industry still point to 
guidelines claiming self-regulatory schemes are in place, when in fact there is nothing 
that is enforceable by law. In short, self-regulatory codes for the greater part are a 
political tool to avoid regulation. 
 
PROPOSED WAYS FORWARD 
In the United States two senators recently proposed a Location Privacy Protection Act 
which is meant to empower mobile phone subscribers.32 The bill provides that an 
organisation that collected location data from mobile or wireless data devices would have 
to explicitly state in their privacy policies what was being collected, in plain English. 
Essentially this is the recommendation of the Internet Engineering Task Force for 
Geographic Location/Privacy (IETF GEOPRIV) working group which finalised that 
technical systems include “Fair Information Practices to defend against harms associated 
with the use of location technologies.”33 These practices should be thought of as 
“countermeasures” to technical systems that handle personal information such as location 
data. Another two United States senators acted similarly, in the same month the Location 
Privacy Protection bill was put forward, announcing the GPS Act meant to stamp down 
on warrantless tracking by law enforcement personnel. This bill is supposed to “balance 
the needs of Americans’ privacy protections with the legitimate needs of law enforcement, 
and maintains emergency exceptions.”34 One downside is the narrowness of the 
definition- next will come the Wi-Fi Act, the A-GPS Act etc. That approach is obviously 
unviable in the longer term as new innovations emerge. Acts must strive for appropriate 
generality and avoid inappropriate technology-specificity, and should be based on 
semantics not syntax. But the much more serious problem is that the provision represents 
legal authorisation for grossly privacy-invasive location and tracking. IETF engineers, 
and now Congressmen, want to compromise human rights and increase the imbalance of 
power between business and consumers. 
 
When one assesses the current climate of technological deployment, the observation is 
made that information risks are addressed only as they emerge. There is a reactive force 
at play rather than a proactive force to ensure avoidance or mitigation of potential privacy 
breaches in the uberveillance trajectory. In Australia at least, existing laws hardly address 
the locational privacy issues that are facing the public. The problem is that there are bits 
and pieces of statute that pertain to parts of the problem under separate legislative 
regimes and in separate jurisdictions. There is no overarching framework for or even 
consistency among the laws. This causes confusion and inevitably results in inadequate 
protections for citizens.35  
 
One approach to the problem would be a Location Privacy Protection Act or a GPS Act, 
as has been proposed in the United States, although it would need to embody far stronger 
protections than mere notification of the privacy breaches that the technology entails. An 
alternative is amendment of the current privacy legislation and other anti-terrorism 
legislation in order to create appropriate regulatory provisions, and deny the gaps that 
LSPs are exploiting.36 It is time that sensitive data like location information and DNA 
profile data be protected through improved legislation, with “guidelines” no longer being 
used as a substitute for actual protections but instead playing a supporting role. The social 
implications of not proceeding to protect citizen rights37 where personal location 
information is concerned will inevitably lead to disproportionate covert surveillance 
being conducted by government and business, and even citizens.38 
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